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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

NEIL CARLISLE and l\'JERRILL
EWELL dba CARLISLE AND
E'VELL, a partnership,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs-

CLIFORD COX and ALLEN COX,
and,

Case No.
12802

Defendant.ff and Appellants,

V. LEWIS KO:FFORD,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This was an action brought by plaintiffs and respondents, Neil Carlise and l\Ieaill Ewell dba Carlisle
and Ewell, based upon UCA 14-2-1 et. seq. (as amended). Plaintiffs alleged they were unpaid subcontractors
under a contract calling for the purchase and installation of a furn ace in a building owned by defendants
and appellants, Allen and Clifford Cox. Defendant
Lewis Kofford was alleged to be the general contractor.

•
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DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The case was tried to the court sitting without a
jury, the lionorable Allen B. Sorenson, .Judge. Shortly after the pre-trial conference, the trial court denied
Cox's motion to amend the court's pre-trial order which
limited the defenses of the defendants Cox and further
refused to allow the Coxes to add a counterclaim or a
crossclaim. Thereafter at trial, the court refused to hear
evidence by defendants, Allen and Clifford Cox, relating to any defense they might have, legal or equitable, except for the question if the plaintiffs' action had
been timely filed. The court found against defendants,
Allen and Clifford Cox, on that issue and granted judgment against Allen and Clifford Cox in the amount of
$1,.551.00 together with interest at 8% per annum from
the date of the decree.

RELIEF SOUGI-rr ON AJ>PEAI,
Defendants and appellants, Allen and Clifford
Cox, request the Supreme Court's order reversing the
trial court's judgment, or in the alternative, remanding
this action back to the trial court with instructions to
permit the Cox's counterclaim and cross complaint and
to take evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the Cox's equitable and legal
defenses against plaintiffs.

8

ST.ATEl\iENT OF :FACTS
This action was filed by the plaintiffs, Neil Carlisle
and
Ewell, dba Carlisle and Ewell, on Febru·
ary 13, 1970. (See clerk's notation on the back of plaintiff's' complaint.) Plaintiffs' attorney was N oall T.
ootton of American Fork, Utah; defendants and appellants, Allen and Clifford Cox, retained Leon 1\1.
Frazier as counsel, and the defendant, V. Lewis Kofford, retained Robert l\loody of Provo, Utah, as
counsel.

'V

l\ir. Frazier answered the plaintiffs' complaint by
making a general denial and then made a motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' complaint upon the ground that it
was not timely filed. 'rhe motion was denied, but l\1r.
thereafter did not amend his answer to raise
a<lditional defenses or add a counterclaim or crossclaim.
In November of 1970, l\1r. Frazier handled the answering or interrogatories posed by the plaintiffs to the
defendants, Allen and Clifford Cox.
In late November of 1970, Mr. Frazier fell ill with
what proved to be terminal brain cancer and thereafter
died in July of 1971 with no further work having been
<lone on this case.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled for October
8, 1971. Due to the death of l\Ir. Frazier, the defendant
Coxes retained J. Brent Wood as counsel to represent
them at the conference. l\ir. Wood was not very well
acquainted with the facts of the case, but due to his

relatively little trial experience, he allowed the pre-trial
conference to be held as scheduled. The court was aware
of l\1r. Wood's difficult position (R. 32).
At the pre-trial conference the various issues to he
tried were discussed including the applicability of the
bonding statute and its one year statute of limitation.
While l\lr. 'Vood agreed that the bonding statute was
apparently applicable, he insisted that the plaintiffs
show that they were equitably entitled to relief under
the statute. That is to say that their own knowledge of
certain facts, their own actions and the original agreement and understanding of the parties as to payment
would not, as a matter of equity, bar them from the
benefits · of the bonding statute. Mr. 'V ood clearly
raised this issue at the pre-trial conference (see pretrial transcript, p. a).
When the pre-trial order was received by counsel,
the order did not contain these equitable defenses of
the Coxes. l\Ir. Wood moved to amend the pre-trial
order. (Record on Appeal, item 29). At the hearing
this motion, the court stated that it felt that l\fr. 'Vood
was really asking to amend the pleadings. lVIr. '"'ood
responded that he did not believe that it was really
necessary to amend the pleaclings to allow the defenses
discussed at pre-trial to be tried. l\Ir. Wood then stated
that with his present knowledge of the case, he would
like to amend the pleadings to include counterclaims
against the other parties and so moved the court.
The court's subsequent minute entry dated N ovember 5, 1971, denied all of the motions. The same entry
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shows that the trial court understood l\1r. "\\rood's motions to correct the pre-trial order concerning the defendants' defenses and to allow counterclaims by
amending the pleadings (see Record on Appeal, item
33).
On the issues allowed at trial, the following facts
were presented. The subject subcontract was for the
purchase and installation of a 160,000 IJTlJ furnace
with an approximate value of $1900.00 in a maintenance
shed being built by the defendant Kofford for the
Coxes. The plaintiffs had the burden of showing that
they were within the one year statute of limitations required by UCA 14-2-1 et. seq. which meant that all
work had to be complete on or prior to February 13,
1969. It was uncontroverted that the bulk of the installation work was <lone during Nov e m be r of
1068 and that the job was inspected and
passed hy a l\H. Fuel Supply serviceman on December n, 19G8 (R. 48). By that date, the work was
complete except for installing a register cover on a heat
duct. On or about December 23, 1968, the plaintiffs
returned to the maintenance shed to install the register.
The shed had been in use since the December 6th inspction hy l\1t. Fuel. The plnintiffs then introduced
evidence that they were short one register cover on December 23rd which was back ordered by one of their
suppliers.
The plaintiffs conceded at trial (R. 23-24) that
they did not consider the grill or register to be very im-
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portant to the job. The plaintiffs conceded that rather
than wait some unknown amount of time for one supplier to get the register, they could have purchased it
from a number of other suppliers (R. 21-23). The
plaintiffs admitted that their supplier. in fact, merely
purchased the registers from another competing supplier and sold it to the plaintiffs (see note on plaintiffs'
exhibit No. 3) .
The plaintiffs· conceded that after rece1vmg the
register, no special efforts were made to install the
allegedly missing register. Plaintiff Carlisle admits
"stopping by" the maintenance shed several times on
his way into town on other business, but stated that he
didn't find the door open until February 19, 1960, when
he allegedly walked into the shed and dropped the register into its place in the cement floor. The plaintiff
admits that he did not consider the missing register mportant enough to arrange a tme for its installation
with the Coxes by phoning them on one of their several
24 hour phones listed in the telephone directory. (R.
35-37 and 66-67) The counsel for the plaintiffs agreed
and stipulated (R. 67-68) that the pluintiff Carlisle
could have installed the register earlier than February
19, 1969 "if there had been a great enough urgency."
,;vhen asked by l\ir. Wood how the plaintiff could
recall when he installed the last register, the plaintiff,
from the stand, produced an unrecorded lien (def cndants' exhibit No. 5) on the property which was
prepared the morning after the last work was allegedly
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perf orrnl'<l. The plaintiff admitted that he had not filed
the lien which would have put the Coxes on notice of
non-payment because he promised the defendant I\offord that he would not file it (R. 33). A year later,
after the defendant Kofford went bankrupt, the plaintiffs advised the defendants of non-payment and filed
suit under UCA § 14-2-1, as amended.
The existence of defendants' exhibit No. 5 was not
known to l\:Ir. Wood or the Coxes prior to the trial. A
close examination of the completion date on the mechanic's lien (defendants' exhibit No. 5) signed by Neil
Carlisle shows that the completion date was obviously
changed from December 23, 1968 to February 19, 1969.
the back of the card attached to defendants' exhibit
No. 5 shows the work date of October 24 through Decem her 23, 1968. Plaintiff admitted that he had the
card in his desk at work with the lien for two years but
he could not explain the dates and would not admit to
ownership of the card attached to his lien document
(R. 72-79). The trial court refused all attempts of l\Ir.
Wood to introduce the lien or card into evidence. The
document was ultimately introduced by counsel for
defendant V. Lewis Kofford relative to another issue.
The plaintiffs introduced evidence (see plaintiffs'
exhibit No. 3) that the value of the register was two
dollars and twenty-six cents ( $2.26).
The defendant Cox introduced evidence tending to
show that the job was complete just prior to Christmas
when the registers were installed. ( R. 46-49; 51-52 ; 64) .
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The Coxes testified that they were at the maintenance
shed a high percentage of the time during .January and
February and had the plaintiffs stopped at the shed as
many times as they claimed during the normal hours,
they would have been there (R. 58-61; 66-67). They
testified that all registers were installed in December.
The Coxes further testified that the plaintiffs
never attempted to phone them or otherwise make an
effort to install the allegedly missing register. The
Coxes further testified that they were never asked to
pay the plaintiffs for the work done nor were they ever
told by the plaintiffs that they had not been paid. They
testified that they had no knowledge of non-payment
until the suit was filed a year later.
Over
'Vood's repeated objections, the court refused to take evidence or consider any equitable defense
or a\'Oidance based on the actions of the plaintiffs or
on the understanding of the parties as to responsibility
of payment.
'V ood attempted but was precluded
from introducing evidence to show:
(a) That the plaintiffs from the inception of
the contract, understood and agreed that they would
Kofford for payment; that the Coxes
look only to
would not be paying Kofford cash for the heating and
plumbing subcontract work as it was to be paid by an
offset for monies owed by Kofford to Cox; that the
plaintiffs were not the low bidders for the subcontract
work but they would be given the work even at their
higher bid if they recognized the "offset payment" to

Kofford and would look only to him for payment.
(R. 30 and 91).
(b) That the plaintiffs looked only to Kofford
for payment for a full year after the completion of the
work; that the plaintiffs never asked the defendant
Cox for payment; that the plaintiffs never filed a lien
against the Coxes even though one was prepared because the plaintiffs agreed with the defendant Kofford
not to file the lien ( R. 33-34) .
( c) That the plaintiffs deliberately participated
and conspired with l\lr. Kofford in keeping the Coxes
ignorant of the plaintiffs' alleged non-payment to further their own interest i.e.: ( 1) If the Coxes discovered
the non-payment they would not continue to do excavation and sewer work for Kofford on a credit basis;
( 2) if the Coxes discovered the non-payment, they
would have pressed for the balance due them from Kofford which would have caused the financial collapse of
Kofford to the substancial injury of the plaintiffs who
were major creditors of the defendants Kofford; (3) if
the Coxes did not discover the non-payment then the
plaintiff could work himself into a position to be treated
as a preferred creditor if and when financial collapse
of Kofford came. (See R. 91 & 99-101, where plaintiffs
admit receiving all of defendant Kofford's assets which
were applied to and satisfied all other contract work
between the plaintiffs and defendant Kofford. The
other creditors of Kofford, such as the Coxes, remain
unpaid.)
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ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FOR1\IULATING ITS PRE-TRIAL ORDER
RU L E 16, U.R.C.P.) AND l?URTHER ERRED IN REFUSING APPELLANTS' Til\IEL Y l\IOTION TO
Al\IEND TIIAT ORDER BOTH OF
"\VIII CH CA U SE D THE APPELLANTS TO BE DENIED A HEARING
OF THEIR CASE UPON ITS l\IEllITS.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure controls pre-trial procedure and the formation and effect
of the court's pre-trial order. A pre-trial order entered
into at variance with the rule would not be binding on
the parties. Paragraph five of Rule 16 " . . . limits the
issues for trial to those not disposed of by adrnissions or
agreements of counsel . . . " (emphasis added) The
transcript of the pre-trial conference (pre-trial transcript, p. 3) supports l\Ir. \Vood's claim that he had
raised all of his defenses against the plaintiffs. Certainly, the transcript of the pre-trial conference does notsupport an argument that l\Ir. vV ood had stipulated
or agreed to dispose of all of his client's defenses except the issue as to whether or not plaintiffs' action
was timely filed. Nor does Rule 16 ( 5) permit the unsupported conclusions of the court to be binding upon
the parties; the language is specific in disposing only
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of those issues agreed to by counsel by way of admissions or agreement. If there was a mistake or misunderstanding (and that may have been the case) then the
trial court should have allowed Mr. Wood's timely motion to amend the pre-trial as to those issues which he
claimed were improperly omitted.
It is, of course, clear that there must be some point
in the pre-trial process at which the issues to he litigated
at trial was bindingly determined. However, the basic
policy considerations underlying Rule 16 are that the
parties and the court have notice, and ample time, to
prepare for the issues which are to be litigated at trial.
This explains why the "manifest injustice" rule of Rule
16 applies to attempts to modify the pre-trial order at
trial.

As noted in an article entitled "Federal Pre-trial
Practice: A Study of l\Iodification and Sanctions"
found at 51 Geo.L.J. 309 ( 1963), the purpose of the
federal rules (and in this case, the Utah rule is the
same as the federal n1le) is to "avoid the tendency of
the common law to punish a litigant for his counsel's
negligences and oversights by depriving him of his right
to he heard on the merits" (Id. at 309-310) while at the
same time, to eliminate the possibility of surprise at trial
to opposing counsel. There are no policy reasons to support the trial court in limiting the issues at trial and
thereby denying a party a hearing on the merits when
a timely modificaton of the pre-tral order could have
been made without causing surprise or inconvenience
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to opposing counsel or the court. This view would seem
to explain why the "manifest injustice" rule of Rule 16
is directed to attempts at trial to modify the pre-trial
order which deprive opposing counsel of notice. It also
explains why nearly all of the annotations in "DI oore's
Federal Practice relating to Rule 16 are concerned with
amendments at trial and not prior thereto. (See, for
example, llf onod vs. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2nd 1170
( 1969) ) This view seems borne out by Judge Holtzoff
in lJicCarthy vs. Lerner Stores Corporation, 9 FRD 31
(DDC 1949) where he stated:
"if counsel waits until the trial, he is bound by
the pre-trial order, unless the trial court relieves him of the pre-trial order to prevent
man ifest injustice. Of course, it is contemplated that this will be done only in exceptional
cases as otherwise the adverse party may be
taken by surprise and in a proper case, may be
come entitled to a continuance and possibly a
mis-trial if the case is tried before a jury.
(emphasis added)
In A"imith Contracting Corporation vs. Trojan Construction Co., Inc., 192 F 2nd 234 (10th Circut 1951), ·
the I Oth Circuit remanded the cause back to the trial
court with instructions to include a counterclaim precluded by the pre-trial order. The court there said:
We are of the opinion, however, that rigid adherance to pre-trial conference agreements
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should not be exacted especially where so to do
will result in in.justice to one part;lj and relaxing of such agreement will not cause prejudice
ot the other party. Requiring rigid adherance
to pre-trial conference agreements will tend to
discourage cooperation of counsel and their
willingness to agree at the pre-trial conference
as to the real and substantive issues to be presented and will impair the effectiveness of the
pre-trial conference procedm·e. (emphasis
added)
Rule 16 permits an amendment at trial to an otherwise binding pre-trial order where to do otherwise would
impose "manifest injustice" upon one of the parties.
The trial court's refusal to hear defendants and appellants' case upon its merits resulted in "manifest injustice" to them and an amendment of the pre-trial
order should have been permitted at trial. Thus, the
trial court's refusal to amend the pre-trial order upon
timely motion made well before trial should be reversed
and the matter remanded to the trial court for hearing
upon the issues excluded at trial. Sec, Central DistribuInc., 403 F.2nd 943 (1968).
tors Inc. vs.
It cannot be seriously argued that the defendants
and appellants, Allen and Clifford Cox, received a full
hearing of their case on its merits. Also, it can be quite
forcefully argued that, if the Coxes could prove the
matters contained in their offer of proof they may very
well have defeated the plaintiffs' right to recover. See,
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for example, Apc.v Lumber vs. Commanche Construction Co., 18 Utah 2nd 119, 419 P.2nd 121, 132 (1966)
for an instance in which plaintiffs' conduct was held to
have estopped them from the benefits of UCA 14-2-1
et. seq. as amended.
Thus, in a case such as the one at bar where the
trial court's ruling has clearly denied a party a hearing
upon the merits of his case and quite possibly has affected the outcome of the trial, it should obviously follow that such a ruling should have been correct and
should have been supported by the most compelling of
policy reasons.
POINT II
TfIE TRIAL COURT EHRED IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS vVERE ESTOPPED FROM
CLAil\IING THE BENEFITS OF UCA
14-2-1 et. seq. AS Al\IENDED, BECAUSE
OF THE COURSE OF THEIR CONDUCT RELATIVE TO TI-IE SUBJECT
CONTRACT.
Even under the facts allowed to be introduced at
trial, the trial court as a matter of law and equity should
have found that the plaintiffs' actions estopped them
from recovering. The plaintiffs admitted that they
didn't file a lien on Coxes property because the defendant Kofford asked them not to file it as "the money
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was on the way and it wouldn't be necessary to file the
lien." ( R. 33-34). Apparently, months later the plaintiff took all of the equipment owned by Kofford as
security on the balance owed by Kofford. The equipment was given to secure all debts between the plaintiffs
and the defendant Kofford (R. 90). Then Kofford
helped the plaintiffs sell most of the equipment to satisfy the debts (R. 90).
l\1r. Kofford was allowed to use some of the equipment from time to time and actually kept some of the
equipment. When Kofford's corporation finally became insolvent, the plaintiffs on their own determined
the value of the security held, sold some of it and applied the credits. The plaintiffs determined the value
of the remaining equipment and how the credit was to
be applied. The court would not allow l\'lr. Wood to
question plaintiffs' evaluation (R. 90-93). Further, the
plaintiff admits that he credited all other jobs (debts)
between the plaintiffs and defendant Kofford before
he applied any credit to the Cox job. (On the other
jobs the plaintiff had waived his lien rights in favor of
State Savings & Loan Association.)
Kofford had many subcontractors who were creditors including the Coxes. The plaintiffs did not notify
the Coxes that they had not been paid for the furnace
work until the plaintiffs acquired all of the assets of
the defendant Kofford, sold what they wanted to sell,
kept the rest, applied the monies to the jobs they desired
and then sued Cox for an alleged balance due.
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In sober silence to the everlasting damage of other
creditors, the plaintiffs consumed the assets of the defendant Kofford and then complained that it wasn't
enough to make them whole. They now assert that they
really did not rely on the defendant Kofford for payment, they merely failed to approach the Coxes for payment until the defendant Kofford was insolvent.
By looking to Kofford for payment, failing to lien
or notify the Coxes of non-payment, accepting equipment as security for payment and by selecting which
accounts to credit for the value of the equipment estops
them as a matter of law and equity from recovery from
the Coxes. Apex Lumber Co. vs. Conimanche Construction Co., 18 Utah 2nd 119, 417 P.2nd 131.
POINT III
AS A l\1ATTER OF LA\V7 TIIE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
F'IND TIIAT THE LAST l\IATERIAL
\VAS SUPPLIED AND TI-IE LAST
LABOR PERFORl\1ED ON THE SUBJECT CONTRACT ON OR BEFORE
DECE1\1BER 23, 1968.
assuming that one register was not installed
on or before December 23, 1968, and was left until
February 19, 1969, the court erred in not ruling as a
matter of law that the contract was completed on December 23, 1968.
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Apparently, plaintiff considered the job complete
long before February 19, 1969, as he testified that he
had an appointment to prepare a lien for the 20th of
February.
(a) The lien was apparently originally prepared
with December 23, 1968 as the completion date and later
changed. This change was only noticed by defendant
Cox's counsel after the conclusion of the trial when
counsel received a copy of the original from the court
clerk.
The actions of plaintiff either show that ( 1) he
considered the job complete enough to have an appointment to prepare a lien on the property and/ or ( 2) plaintiff intentionally and/ or deliberately withheld final performance on the contract until he could meet with his
atton1ey to prepare lien. This deliberate delay would
also bar his recovery.
Plaintiffs' lack of concern for obtaining and installing the register is further evidence that the plaintiffs considered the job complete. Plaintiff testified
that he made no attempt to secure the back-ordered register - even though the register was readily available
from other suppliers. Plaintiffs were so unconcerned
with the last register that they made no attempt to purchase the item from any of the many supply stores in
the Utah County and Salt Lake City area.
Plaintiffs' further unconcern for the delivery of
the final register is evident by the fact that he failed to
contact the defendant Cox by phone or stopping by the
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Cox home and office which is only several blocks from
the building. The defendant Cox has several telephone
numbers including a 24 hour number listed in the directory hut the plaintiffs did not make any phone attempts
or visit attempts to set a time for the delivery of the one
register.
The plaintiffs never made any effort or special trips
to install the register. Plaintiff Carlisle merely stated
"Well, you can see the building from the freeway, and
we do quite a bit of work in Provo, and each time I
would go by I would either stop in or notice if there
were any trucks or people around the building. I would
say probably four attempts before I got in the building." (R. 18). This inaction can only lead to an inference of unconcern for the minor act of delivery or an
intentional failure to deliver in the attempt to keep the
filing period running while the plaintiff attempted to
collect from defendant Kofford.
(b) Regardless of plantiffs' negligent attitude in
obtaining and: delivering the register and regardless of
whether he intentionally attempted to continue the running of the filing period, the final delivery of a $2.26
register which required no labor to drop in a hole, is so
insignificant an act that the court erred in not ruling as
a matter of law that the job complete, for all purposes
contemplated by the bonding statute.
The $2.26 register represents .0011385 percent of
the heating and plumbing subcontract. This means that
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even according to the plaintiffs' evidence, the job was
99.99887 percent complete on December 23, 1968 .. Certainly, if the defendants Cox under some remote theory
were to claim that the defendant failed to complete the
contract in December, the court would consider such a
claim as ridiculous.
Some courts in construing mechanic lien statutes
have accepted the least scintilla of work as being sufficient to keep the job from being considered complete.
Such decisions work an injustice on the unsuspecting
public.
The Utah Supreme Court to date has never had
occasion to rule directly on the issue of substantial completion as actual completion under UCA 14-2-1 as
amended. Certainly the facts of this case afford the
court with ample justification for requiring more than
a scintilla of work or material to cause a job to remain
uncompleted. It was not disputed at trial that nearly
all of the work was completed on the furnace by December of 1968, sufficiently that the job was inspected
and passed hy l\1t.
Supply on December 6, 1968.
By :Febniary of 1969 the job undisputedly was virtually complete except that plaintiffs alleged that a small
grill or register which covers the end of a duct had not ·
been installed because it had been back-ordered, and
this Mr. Carlisle claimed to do on },ebruary 19th of that
year.
Even assuming that the register was installed as
claimed, the plaintiffs concede ( R. 23-24) that the grill
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m question was not particularly important and that
plaintiffs made no special effort to obtain it. They also
Carlisle carried the grill with him in
admitted that
his truck for nearly a month before taking it into the
shop and dropping it into place. Also, the dates on the
mechanic's lien provided for the job in question demonstrate beyond a doubt that
Carlisle considered the
job completed before February of 1969.
This court has recognized in Apex Lumber v. Comrnanche Construction Co., 18 Utah 2nd 119, 419 P.2nd,
the difficult burden of UCA 14-2-1 and therefore
sh o u] d look with askance at the scintilla of
work theory when construing UCA 14-2-1. The minute
value of tf1e undelivered register (requiring no labor
to drop it in a hole) coupled with the plaintiffs' unconcern and casual treatment of the obtaining and delivery
of the part, etc. mentioned above, justly require a finding of December 23, 1968 as being the date of comple··
tion of the contract.
Respectfully submitted,
FRAZIER & WOOD

J". Brent Wood
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
110 South 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601

